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THE MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE POST SEPTEMBER 11:
WHY IT SHOULD NOT INCLUDE GRAND JURY WITNESSES
ROBERT BOYLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cornerstones of the American system of justice are the require-
ment that a person neither be subjected to unreasonable seizures1
nor be deprived of liberty without due process of law.2  Since Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the United States Department of Justice has in-
creasingly sought to circumvent these constitutional protections
through utilization of the Material Witness Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144
(“Material Witness Statute”), to incarcerate individuals thought to
have information relevant to a grand jury investigation.3  Upon the
mere conclusory statement of a government official that a person
has material information and might not respond to a subpoena, the
person may be incarcerated for an indefinite period of time, with-
out bail, and under onerous conditions.
Consider the case of twenty-year-old Osama Awadallah, a
Jordanian national of Palestinian descent.  On September 20, 2001,
Mr. Awadallah resided in San Diego, California, where he worked
* Robert J. Boyle is a solo practitioner in New York City specializing in criminal
appellate law.  J.D. Brooklyn Law School, 1980; B.S. S.U.N.Y. New Paltz, 1977.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 provides:
Release or detention of a material witness
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a
person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may
become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a
judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in
accordance with section 3142 of this title.  No material witness may be de-
tained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the
testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if
further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.  Release of
a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the
deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
13
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 10 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 10 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR206.txt unknown Seq: 2 16-APR-04 8:54
14 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
and attended college.4  At about 10:30 A.M., eight FBI agents sur-
rounded him in the parking lot of his apartment complex.  The FBI
was investigating Mr. Awadallah because its agents found a scrap of
paper, among other papers, with the words “Osama 589-5316” in-
side the trunk of a car at Washington-Dulles International Airport
that had been abandoned by one of the alleged September 11 hi-
jackers.  As the government quickly determined, Mr. Awadallah had
not used that telephone number for 17 months.
Four agents simultaneously approached Mr. Awadallah and
questioned him, while others surrounded him on the periphery.
He was ordered into his apartment so the interrogation could
continue.  Once inside, it was the FBI that decided whether or not
Mr. Awadallah could say his mid-day prayers.  They did not allow
him to use the bathroom unless they could watch him urinate.  Af-
ter a period of time, the FBI decided to continue the interrogation
at the FBI office.  Once there, Mr. Awadallah was placed in a room
latched from the inside with a trick lock.5  He was not free to leave
the FBI office and was prevented from attending his evening class.
When Mr. Awadallah was hungry, after fasting, he was not given an
adequate meal, but only a snack from a vending machine.  The FBI
then told him that they would not be finished until he passed a
polygraph test, which could only be conducted the next day.
As he promised, Mr. Awadallah voluntarily returned to the FBI
office the following morning.  According to two FBI agents, who
interviewed Mr. Awadallah during the two days preceding his for-
mal arrest, Mr. Awadallah had been extremely cooperative and “not
defiant in any way.”6  Mr. Awadallah was formally detained only af-
4. Much of this article has been excerpted from the Brief for Appellee Osama
Awadallah filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case
United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003)(No. 01-1269), written by counsel
for Mr. Awadallah, Robert J. Boyle and Lawrence M Stern.  The author also wishes to
acknowledge the contribution of the New York Council of Defense Lawyers and the
New York Civil Liberties Union, both of whom submitted amicus curae briefs in support
of Awadallah.  The author also wishes to thank the staff of this Law Review and their
advisors for their assistance.
5. A “trick lock” appears like an unlocked door knob that is, in fact locked.
Thus, if Awadallah had attempted to terminate the interview and leave the room, he
would have been prevented from doing so.
6. Joint Appendix at 251, 302, 329, United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d
Cir. 2003) (stating that Mr. Awadallah was “very cooperative”; “very, very cooperative”;
“fully cooperative”).
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2003] THE MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE 15
ter he “specifically told the agents that he was not willing to [volun-
tarily] go to New York.”  Several hours after his detention, Mr.
Awadallah was arrested pursuant to a material witness warrant
signed earlier that day in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
Although accused of no crime, Mr. Awadallah was classified as
a high security inmate at the San Diego Metropolitan Correctional
Center (“MCC”) and placed in solitary confinement.  He was not
permitted contact with family or friends.  Mr. Awadallah did not
appear in court until September 24, but the proceeding was ad-
journed to September 25 because no interpreters were available.
Mr. Awadallah’s attorney requested that he be deposed, but that
motion was ignored.  On September 27, Mr. Awadallah was trans-
ported first to San Bernadino and then to the Federal Transfer
Center in Oklahoma City.  He did not arrive at the New York MCC
until October 1, ten days after his arrest.  During the transport, Mr.
Awadallah’s whereabouts were unknown to his family and his attor-
ney.  Mr. Awadallah appeared in the Southern District of New York
the next day.  Despite his counsel’s request that he immediately ap-
pear before the grand jury the government succeeded in delaying
that appearance until October 10.
At the New York MCC, Mr. Awadallah was treated in a cruel
and inhumane manner. He was placed in a cell so cold his skin
turned blue and he was kicked by a guard and thrown into a chair.
The same guard jammed his face into an elevator wall, made his
handcuffs extremely tight, stepped on the chain linking his ankles,
and pulled his hair to move his face in front of an American flag.
The FBI agents who saw the bruises on Mr. Awadallah’s body after
he arrived at the New York MCC ignored them and did not even
mention the injuries in their reports.
The government’s response to Mr. Awadallah’s ordeal in
prison was:
Although this Court may find that, during Mr. Awadal-
lah’s 20 day-detention, there were times when he did not
receive a religious diet (although it had been ordered for
him), the floor of his cell was wet with dirty water on two
days, an officer twisted his hand and forced his face down
while he was kneeling, an officer threw a pair of shoes at
him, and officers handled him roughly and/or made in-
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16 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
appropriate remarks-none of which is condoned by the
Government-he was not “torture[d].”7
Mr. Awadallah spent a total of 20 days in jail before he was
finally summoned to a grand jury.  Based on his testimony before
the grand jury, Mr. Awadallah was subsequently indicted for per-
jury.8  On April 30, 2002 the court dismissed the indictment, stating
that Mr. Awadallah’s arrest was illegal because the Material Witness
Statute did not authorize the arrest of grand jury witnesses.9  Mr.
Awadallah remained in custody for a total of 83 days before he was
finally released on bail.  On November 7, 2003, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed Judge
Scheindlin’s order and reinstated Mr. Awadallah’s indictment.10
This article contends that grand jury witnesses are plainly ex-
cluded from the provisions of the Material Witness Statute and re-
lated statutes.  In addition, given the nature of grand jury
proceedings, any attempt to authorize the arrest of putative wit-
nesses cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Part I of this article
examines whether grand jury proceedings have traditionally been
considered criminal proceedings and concludes that they have not.
Part II examines the text of the Material Witness Statute and related
statutes and explains why under principles of statutory construc-
tion, the Material Witness Statute cannot be read to include grand
jury witnesses.  Finally, Part III argues that interpreting the Material
Witness Statute to authorize the arrest of grand jury witnesses would
violate the Constitution.
7. Government’s Post-Hearing Reply Memorandum at 25, United States v.
Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003).
8. During his interrogations and in the grand jury, Mr. Awadallah readily admit-
ted that he had been acquainted with one of the alleged September 11 hijackers, Nawaf
Al-Hazmi, and a second man who usually accompanied him since they all attended the
same San Diego mosque.  But he testified that he could not recall the second man’s
name.  The sole basis for the perjury indictment was a school notebook in Mr. Awadal-
lah’s handwriting which contained the second man’s name, “Khalid” another pur-
ported hijacker.  Although Awadallah corrected his testimony on the very next day, he
was nonetheless indicted for perjury.
9. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Scheindlin,
J.). Judge Scheindlin held that the fruits of the unlawful arrest—the allegedly perjuri-
ous testimony—must be suppressed.
10. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003).  A petition for rehear-
ing en banc has been filed.  As of the date of this article, there has been no decision on
that petition.
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2003] THE MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE 17
II. ARE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS?
The Material Witness Statute authorizes the arrest of material
witnesses in “criminal proceedings.”  Is a grand jury proceeding a
“criminal proceeding” as that term is utilized in the Material Wit-
ness Statute?  The United States Supreme Court has made clear
that while the grand jury is necessary to the initiation of the crimi-
nal process, it is separate and apart from that proceeding.  The pur-
pose of a grand jury is to inquire into the existence of “possible”
criminal conduct.11  The grand jury is a “body of laymen, free from
technical rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no one because
of prejudice and to free no one because of special favor.”12  It is
presumed to be “acting independently of either the prosecuting at-
torney or judge”13 in order to “clear the innocent, no less than
bring to trial those who may be guilty.”14  It acts as the “substantive
safeguard against oppressive and arbitrary proceedings.”15  Clearly,
a constitutional safeguard against the public opprobrium and op-
pression associated with criminal proceedings is not itself a “crimi-
nal proceeding.”
To be sure, grand juries are addressed in Title 18 of the United
States Code, entitled “Crimes and Criminal Procedure,” and grand
jury proceedings are governed by Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (“Fed. R. Crim. P.”).  But that does not, by defi-
nition, render them “criminal proceedings.”16  The grand jury was
not created by Congress when it passed Title 18 or by the United
States Supreme Court when it promulgated the criminal rules.
Rather, it is an institution that was incorporated into the Fifth
Amendment by the Founders.  Like its English ancestor, its basic
11. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
12. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
13. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960).
14. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
15. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959); see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375, 390 (1962) (“[The grand jury is] a primary security to the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution . . . ser[ving] the invaluable function in our soci-
ety of standing between the accuser and the accused.”); Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11
(1887) (“[T]he grand jury is a means of protecting the citizen against unfounded accu-
sation, whether it comes from the government or be prompted by partisan passion or
private enmity.”).
16. The term “criminal proceeding” is defined neither in Title 18 nor the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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18 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
purpose is to see whether there is a legitimate basis for instituting
criminal proceedings.17  Given that purpose, it is logical that when
crafting statutory rules governing grand jury procedures, Congress
would place them within Title 18 and the Fed.R.Crim.P.  It does not
follow, however, that an investigatory proceeding to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether to institute a
criminal proceeding against an individual is itself a criminal
proceeding.
The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Awadallah18
and the Ninth Circuit’s 1971 decision in Bacon v. United States,19 are
the only federal appellate decisions to address whether a grand jury
proceeding is a criminal proceeding in the material witness con-
text.  Both courts held that grand jury proceedings fall under the
Material Witness Statute’s scope.  Both courts also recognized, how-
ever, that other appellate courts have specifically held that grand
juries are not “criminal proceedings.”20
Indeed, many courts have characterized grand jury proceed-
ings as civil.  For example, in 1973, two years after its Bacon deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Alter,21 and held that
the notice provisions of Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) apply to grand jury subpoenas.  In In Re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Manges)22 the same court held that the 60-
day notice requirement for civil appeals under the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure (“Fed. R. App. P.”) 4(a) applied to contempt
adjudications arising out of grand jury proceedings.  The non-crimi-
nal nature of grand jury proceedings has also been recognized in
the Third Circuit, which has held that a motion to quash a grand
jury subpoena is a civil proceeding.23  Similarly, in United States v.
17. Costello, 350 U.S. at 362 (“The grand jury’s basic purpose is to provide a fair
method for instituting criminal proceedings. . . .”) (emphasis added).
18. 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003).
19. 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
20. See United States v. Thompson, 319 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1963) (collecting
cases).  In Awadallah, the Second Circuit also noted that the definition of “criminal
proceeding” contained in Black’s Law Dictionary “could suggest that grand jury pro-
ceedings lie outside the scope of § 3144.” Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 52.
21. 482 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1973).
22. 745 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1984).
23. Lee v. Johnson, 799 F.2d 31, 36-38 (3d Cir. 1986).  In another case, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that criminal cases are prosecutions to secure
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2003] THE MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE 19
Bonnell24 a grand jury subpoena was treated as a civil action for pur-
poses of certifying an appeal from an order refusing to stay its
enforcement.
Contrast the Ninth Circuit decision in Bacon.  There the court
reasoned that Congress must have viewed criminal procedures and
proceedings to include grand jury proceedings because Rule 2 of
the Fed.R. Crim. P. states that the Rules are “intended to provide
for the just determination of every criminal proceeding,” and the
Rules include both Rule 6, governing grand juries, and Rule 17,
governing subpoenas.25  But that reasoning, as the District Court
found in Awadallah, is specious:
Rule 2 does not define the phrase “criminal proceeding”
as it is used throughout the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure; nor does it help determine whether a grand
jury is (or is not) a proceeding that necessarily comes
before the initiation of a criminal proceeding as used in
[former] Rule 46 . . . Rule 17 may apply to grand juries,
but it does not mention “criminal proceedings”.  Rather,
it states: “A subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under
the seal of the court.  It shall state the name of the court
and the title, if any of the proceeding and shall command
each person to whom it is directed to attend and give tes-
timony at the time and place specified therein.”26
Any reliance on Rule 2 for the proposition that a grand jury
proceeding is a criminal proceeding is further negated by examin-
ing other instances where the term “criminal proceeding” is uti-
lized.  Specifically, Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 and 12 require certain
elements in criminal proceedings that are not present in grand jury
proceedings.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2) provides that “[n]o judg-
ment or forfeiture may be entered in a criminal proceeding unless
convictions for criminal conduct, civil cases are everything else. United States v. Lavin,
942 F.2d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1991).
24. 483 F. Supp. 1091 (D.Minn. 1979).
25. 449 F.2d at 940-41 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 2).
26. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  In the
Awadallah appeal the government argued that Rule 17(a)’s reference to the title “if
any” of the proceeding “makes clear that the criminal proceeding may be a grand jury
proceeding because all indictments have titles” is unpersuasive.  That Rule, which was
patterned after Rule 45 FED. R. CIV. P. plainly contemplates issuance of subpoenas
before an action or proceeding has been commenced.
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20 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
the indictment or the information provides notice. . .” to the defen-
dant.  However, there is no indictment during a grand jury investi-
gation, and no judgment may be entered during the investigation.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 states that “[p]leadings in criminal proceedings
shall be the indictment and the information, and the pleas shall be
not guilty, guilty and nolo contendere.”  Contrast grand jury pro-
ceedings, where there is no indictment until all the witnesses are
examined and the grand jury has completed its work.  And, of
course, no pleas are necessary because no one has yet been charged
with a crime.
Therefore, since courts have held that civil procedures apply to
grand jury proceedings and criminal proceedings require elements
that grand jury proceedings lack, grand jury proceedings are not
plainly within the Material Witness Statute’s scope.  Moreover, as
discussed in the following section, if the rules of statutory construc-
tion are applied, it becomes evident that the Material Witness Stat-
ute does not authorize the arrest of grand jury witnesses.
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE
MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE
Statutory construction must commence with the words of the
statute itself.27  Before resorting to legislative history, the meaning
of ambiguous terms should be determined by examining the spe-
cific context in which the terms are used and the broader statutory
scheme.28  Statutory phrases must not be considered in isolation.29
Rather, a court must look “to the provisions of the whole law and to
its object and policy”30 because a statute’s structure clarifies any am-
biguity in the literal language.31
As discussed above, the term “criminal proceeding” is, at best,
ambiguous.  But under the principle of noscitur a sociis, any ambigu-
ity in a term may be eliminated “by the company it keeps.”32  This
27. Connecticut v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 228 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000).
28. Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)); see also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515
(1993) (holding that the meaning of a statute, plain or not, depends on its context).
29. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).
30. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (citations omitted).
31. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 124 (2000).
32. Gustafsen v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995).
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2003] THE MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE 21
principle requires a court to avoid ascribing to a term a meaning so
broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words because to
do so would give “unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.”33
When this principle is applied to the Material Witness Statute it is
clear that while the statute does not define a “criminal proceeding,”
the accompanying words and sentences in that statute and closely
related statutes demonstrate that the term does not include grand
jury proceedings.
A. The Requirement That The Application Be Made By A “Party”
An application under the Material Witness Statute may only be
made by a “party” to a criminal proceeding.  The phrase “by a party
to a criminal proceeding” clearly “invokes the adversarial process –
a proceeding where there is a prosecutor and a defendant.”34  The
grand jury is not an adversarial proceeding, let alone a criminal
one.  Rather, it is an investigatory body whose primary purpose is to
protect individuals from “the vast power of government.”35  As an
independent body, it is charged with determining whether a crimi-
nal proceeding should be initiated.36  A “party” to a criminal pro-
ceeding does not exist until after the grand jury has returned an
indictment and a criminal proceeding is instituted.37
In their brief to the Second Circuit in Awadallah, the govern-
ment cited Black’s Law Dictionary as providing an “obvious” defini-
tion of a party: “one who takes part in a transaction.”38  The
government argued that because the United States Attorney takes
part in the grand jury’s transactions, that office is the “party” re-
ferred to in the Material Witness Statute.39  But the government’s
reliance on that portion of Black’s Law Dictionary is misplaced be-
cause that definition of “party” is derived from the Uniform Com-
33. Id. at 575 (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co, 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
34. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
35. Id. at 62, n.12 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687, n.23 (1972)).
36. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
37. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63.
38. Government’s Brief at 66, United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (01 Cr. 1026).
39. Id.  Significantly, in Awadallah the arrest warrant application was not even sup-
ported by an affidavit from an Assistant United States Attorney.  The affidavit was sworn
to by an FBI Agent.
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22 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
mercial Code.40  Indeed, Black’s defines “party” in connection with
legal proceedings as “[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought
a party to the lawsuit.”41  That definition clearly contemplates an
adversarial proceeding, which the grand jury is not.
The Second Circuit adopted the government’s position, rea-
soning (in the context of Fed. R. Crim. P. 15, discussed below) that
“[t]he prosecutor and the witness may broadly be deemed parties,
however, in the sense that each has interests to advance and protect
before the grand jury.”42  But as the United States Supreme Court
has emphasized, the United States Attorney is not a “party” to a
grand jury proceeding.  Rather, he or she is the grand jury’s legal
advisor.43  While the United States Attorney’s office does have an
important role in securing evidence and presenting witnesses, it
does so on behalf of the grand jury, not as a “party” appearing
before it.44  A grand jury subpoena is not the “compulsory process
of the United States Attorney’s Office . . . for the purpose of con-
ducting his own inquisition.”45
When interpreting a statute, a court must strive to give effective
meaning to every clause and word.46  Courts are thus reluctant to
treat statutory language as surplusage in any setting.47 Congress ex-
pressly limited the scope of the Material Witness Statute to applica-
tions by “parties”.  Since there are no parties to grand jury
proceedings, Congress could not have intended that the statute be
used to arrest and detain grand jury witnesses.
40. See U.C.C. §1-201(26).
41. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (7th ed. 1999).
42. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 60 (2d Cir. 2003).
43. See generally United States v. Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. 418, 430 (1983).
44. Id.
45. Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d 520, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also United
States v. Melvin, 546 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1976) (recognizing that a U.S. Attorney may
obtain subpoenas without the knowledge of grand jurors, but re-affirming grand jury’s
exclusive role as the sole agency for compelling disclosure).
46. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).
47. Id. (citing Bobbit v. Sweet Home Chapter Communities for Greater Ore., 515
U.S. 687, 698 (1994)); Connecticut v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 88-89
(2000) (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982)).
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2003] THE MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE 23
B. The “Materiality” Requirement
The Material Witness Statute authorizes the arrest of only those
witnesses whose testimony is “material.”  By its terms, only a judicial
officer is empowered to determine whether the requisite materiality
has been shown.  Extending the statute to grand jury witnesses
would render the materiality requirement superfluous for two
reasons.
First, a grand jury’s task is to inquire into the existence of possible
criminal conduct.48  A grand jury may act on “tips, rumors, evi-
dence offered by the prosecutor or their own personal knowl-
edge.”49  Hearsay is admissible.50  Because of its broad investigatory
powers, a grand jury witness cannot prevail on a motion to quash a
testimonial subpoena on the ground that the information sought is
irrelevant or compliance unreasonable.51  By inserting a materiality
requirement into the Material Witness Statute, Congress expressed
a clear intent to limit the statute’s arrest power to witnesses who
possess information that might affect the result of a case.  But if the
Material Witness Statute is interpreted to encompass grand jury wit-
nesses, the materiality requirement would be eliminated from the
statute because, as stated above, virtually any kind of evidence is
admissible before a grand jury.
Second, the secrecy that attaches to grand jury proceedings via
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) makes it “very difficult, if not impossible, for a
judge to determine who is a material witness.”52  Courts are forced
to rely on “a mere statement by a responsible official, such as the
United States Attorney” when determining materiality.53  Not sur-
prisingly, in Awadallah the government took the position that the
statute requires nothing more than a conclusory statement by a
prosecutor.  But if that position is upheld, the congressionally man-
48. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
49. Id. at 701.
50. FED. R. EVID. 1101.
51. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973); see also United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is
inapplicable to grand jury proceedings).
52. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
53. Id. (quoting Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971)). See also
In re DeJesus Berrios, 706 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1983) (declining to require more than
a mere statement because to do so “would require an exposure of inquiry being pur-
sued by the grand jury”).
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dated requirement of judicial oversight would be written out of the
statute.  It must be presumed that Congress did not enact a super-
fluous requirement.54  More importantly, no statute should be con-
strued to permit the arrest and detention of individuals not
suspected of any crime merely on the statement of a law enforce-
ment official.
The Second Circuit rejected these arguments, agreeing instead
with the reasoning of Chief Judge Michael Mukasey in In Re Material
Witness Warrant.55  In that case the court observed that notwith-
standing grand jury secrecy, there is no great difficulty in assessing
materiality in grand jury proceedings.56  The court analogized to
situations where district courts determine motions to quash, order
witnesses held in contempt, or determine whether a privilege ap-
plies.  Those determinations, however, have little, if anything, to do
with “materiality”.  As pointed out above, a witness may not object
to a testimonial subpoena on relevance grounds.  Nor can the wit-
ness raise irrelevance as “just cause” for refusing to answer in con-
tempt proceedings.  Moreover, the issue of whether a privilege
applies has nothing to do with the materiality of the information.
For example, statements made by a witness to his or her attorney
might be highly relevant on the question of whether a crime has
been committed.  However, they are still protected from disclosure
by the attorney-client privilege.57
It has been argued that it is no more difficult to make a materi-
ality determination for grand jury witnesses than for trial witnesses,
who are clearly within the Material Witness Statute’s scope.  That
argument, however, ignores reality.  As discussed above, there is vir-
tually no restriction on what is “material” to a grand jury investiga-
tion.  Since the proceedings are secret, the government is under no
duty to explain what relevance, if any, the witness’s testimony might
have.  Conversely, prior to trial there is an indictment charging vio-
lations of specific laws.  Time periods are generally set forth.  There
54. Connecticut v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 228 F.3d at 88, 89 (2d Cir.
2000).
55. 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
56. Id. at 294-95.
57. See In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2nd Cir. 1979)(rules of privilege,
including attorney client privilege, apply to grand jury proceedings).
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is disclosure under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16  and Brady v. Maryland.58
While it might not always be an easy task to “fit the witness’s testi-
mony into the grid of other evidence” prior to a trial,59 at least
there is a grid in which to place it.60  During a grand jury investiga-
tion there is none.  As the United States Supreme Court noted in
United States v. Dionisio: “A grand jury’s investigation is not fully car-
ried out until every available clue has been run down and all wit-
nesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been
committed.”61
If the Material Witness Statute is extended to grand juries, it
would undermine clear congressional intent since it would permit
the arrest and detention of individuals who possess immaterial in-
formation simply on the word of a prosecutor.  Such a drastic ex-
pansion of the power to arrest and detain innocent people should
be rejected.
C. The Bail Requirement: 18 U.S.C. § 3142
The Material Witness Statute provides that once arrested, the
witness must be treated “in accordance with the provisions of sec-
tion 3142 of [Title 18],”62 which governs bail.  The prefatory lan-
guage of § 3142 explicitly states that it applies to proceedings
“pending trial.”63  There is, of course, no trial pending during a
grand jury investigation. Assuming arguendo that the word “trial” as
used therein can be read to include a grand jury proceeding (which
it cannot) the factors listed in § 3142 prove that the statute does not
apply to grand jury witnesses.  Congress requires that a judicial of-
ficer consider four factors; however, three of the factors (nature of
the offense charged, weight of the evidence against the person, and
58. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
59. In re Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 295.
60. Chief Judge Mukasey cites to a decision he made involving a grand jury sub-
poena duces tecum.  In contrast to testimonial subpoenas, subpoenas duces tecum are sub-
ject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. R.
Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
61. 410 U.S. 1, 13 (1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) states: “Upon the appearance before a judicial officer of a
person charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order that, pending
trial, the person be [released] or [detained].” (emphasis added).
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danger to the community posed by the person’s release) are inap-
plicable to grand jury witnesses.64
In Awadallah, the Second Circuit ignored any incongruity, rul-
ing that the provisions of § 3142 should govern insofar as they are
applicable to grand jury witnesses.65  Section 3142, however, should
not be judicially rewritten.  Indeed, to do so would violate a cardi-
nal rule of statutory construction: Where a statute’s language is
“plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to
its terms.’”66  Section 3142 provides that a judicial officer “shall”
take into account the factors set forth in § 3142(g).  Yet, if applied
to grand jury witnesses, three of the four factors are rendered su-
perfluous because there is no offense charged, no defendant, and
no danger to the community if the (nonexistent) defendant is re-
leased.  Thus, applying the Material Witness Statute and § 3142 to
grand jury witnesses is “an attempt to fit a square peg into a round
hole.”67
D. The Requirement That Witnesses Be Deposed or Released
When enacting the Material Witness Statute, Congress clearly
was concerned that material witnesses suspected of no wrongdoing
would be released as soon as possible.68  To facilitate their release,
Congress provided that “[n]o material witness may be detained . . .
if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by depo-
sition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) specifically states:
The judicial officer shall, in determining whether there are conditions of
release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person . . . take
into account the available information concerning—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged. . .;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person. . .; and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person’s release.
65. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 61 (2d Cir. 2003).
66. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
67. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). See also
Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174 (stating courts are required to give effect to statutory language
especially where term “occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme”).
68. Congress faced the same concern in enacting the Material Witness Statute’s
predecessor statute, former 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (repealed 1984).
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of justice.”69  The deposition must be taken “pursuant to the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure”.70
Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 governs depositions in criminal cases.  It
provides for depositions of a “party[‘s]” witnesses to “preserve testi-
mony for trial.”71.  This unambiguous language proves that Con-
gress did not intend the Material Witness Statute to apply to grand
jury witnesses because grand jury testimony is not intended to be
used at trial.
Moreover, the deposition procedures required under Rule 15,
while appropriate for trial witnesses, are incompatible with grand
jury proceedings.  Such depositions may only take place upon no-
tice to all parties.72  As discussed above, there are no parties to
grand jury proceedings.  Also, the Confrontation Clause grants the
defendant the right to be present at a deposition taken to preserve
testimony for a criminal trial.73  But, of course, during a grand jury
investigation, there is no defendant and the proceedings are se-
cret.74  Rule 15(d) provides that the “scope and manner of the dep-
osition examination and cross examination must be the same as
would be allowed during the trial”, clearly contemplating that the
Federal Rules of Evidence apply.75  With limited exceptions, those
rules do not apply during grand jury proceedings.76  That neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court promulgated separate procedures
for grand jury witnesses or explicitly stated that Rule 15 procedures
apply to them “only shows that Congress could not have intended
that [the Material Witness Statute] would apply to both pretrial and
grand jury proceedings.”77
Even the government has recognized that Rule 15 cannot be
applied to grand jury witnesses:
The deposition provision of [the Material Witness Stat-
ute] does not apply [to grand jury witnesses]. . . The pro-
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
70. Id.
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (emphasis added).
72. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(b).
73. Id.
74. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
75. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(d) (emphasis added).
76. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(2).
77. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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vision is meant to address the detention of material
witnesses in the pretrial, as opposed to the grand jury,
context.  Indeed, the provision makes explicit reference
to the taking of depositions in accordance with the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 15, regarding
depositions, addresses depositions in lieu of trial testi-
mony in the pretrial context, after charges have been ini-
tiated.  Thus, the rule contemplates the taking of
depositions on notice to the opposing party; no such “op-
posing party” exists until criminal charges against a defen-
dant have been filed.78
Apparently recognizing that this position is in irreconcilable
conflict with their claim that the Material Witness Statute applies to
grand jury witnesses, the government changed its position in its
Awadallah appeal.  Relying on Chief Judge Mukasey’s opinion in In
Re Material Witness Warrant, the government asserted that a deposi-
tion to preserve grand jury testimony might be available, but that it
would “differ in procedure from a deposition to preserve trial testi-
mony”.79  The Second Circuit adopted that view.  The court noted
that the under Rule 15(e), a court may modify certain procedures,
such as limiting the witness’s right to counsel and/or permitting
the introduction of hearsay.80  But that conclusion represents a mis-
reading of Rule 15(e).  As the complete text of that subdivision
demonstrates, while a court may make additional orders, the scope
of a Rule 15 deposition “must” be the same as allowed during a
trial.81  A court is not free to fashion procedures that are neither
78. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (citations omitted).
79. Brief for the Government at 69, United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d
Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1269).
80. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42,60 (2d Cir. 2003).
81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e) provides as follows:
Manner of Taking. Unless these rules or a court order provides other-
wise, a deposition must be taken and filed in the same manner as a deposi-
tion in a civil action, except that:
(1) A defendant may not be deposed without that defendant’s
consent.
(2) The scope and manner of the deposition examination and cross
examination must be the same as would be allowed during trial.
(3) The government must provide to the defendant or the defen-
dant’s attorney, for use at the deposition, any statement of the deponent in
the government’s possession to which the defendant would be entitled at
trial.
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authorized by Congress nor promulgated by the United States Su-
preme Court.82  “Under our Constitution, it is the legislature that
weighs the policy concerns for and against enacting certain laws,
which the courts then construe and apply.”83  The unambiguous
text of the Material Witness Statute requires that any deposition be
conducted pursuant to the Fed. R. Crim. P.  The only criminal pro-
cedure rule governing depositions is Rule 15. That rule limits depo-
sitions to preserving trial testimony and requires that specific
procedures be utilized.84
The Rule 15(a) deposition procedure is an integral part of the
Material Witness Statute’s statutory scheme because it provides the
means whereby an arrested witness may secure his or her freedom.
Since that procedure is unavailable to grand jury witnesses, Con-
gress could not have intended them to be included in the Material
Witness Statute.85
E. Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Fed. R. Crim. P. 46 is entitled “Release From Custody,”86 and
subsection (a) of that rule is entitled “Before Trial,”87 which sup-
ports the conclusion that the Material Witness Statute was not in-
82. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1988).
83. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (citing Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products,
322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944) (“While the judicial function in construing legislation is not a
mechanical process from which judgment is excluded, it is nevertheless very different
from the legislative function . . . Construction is not legislation and must avoid that
retrospective expansion of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of legislation.”)
(citations omitted)).
84. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
85. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). Duncan involved the application
of the one year statute of limitations for the filing of federal habeas corpus petitions
seeking review of State court judgments. 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(2), the statutory tolling
provision, provides that the one year limitations period is tolled while a properly filed
“State post-conviction or other collateral review. . .is pending. . .”.  The petitioner ar-
gued that his prior federal habeas petition fell under the category of “other collateral
review” and therefore tolled the statute.  The Court rejected that argument, holding
that to do so would render the word “State” mere surplusage in a statute where that
term “occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme.”
86. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46.
87. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a) provides: “Before Trial. The provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3142 and 3144 govern pretrial release.”
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tended to apply to grand jury witnesses.88  In their Awadallah
appeal, the government argued that because a grand jury investiga-
tion occurs “prior to trial” that section encompasses grand jury pro-
ceedings.89  The fatal flaw in that reasoning, however, is Rule
46(a)’s requirement that release prior to trial should be governed
by § 3142.”90 Section 3142 specifically refers to release “pending”
trial.  A trial is not pending until there is a defendant charged with
a crime.  The reference to § 3142 in Rule 46(a) undercuts the gov-
ernment’s argument that Rule 46(a) applies to grand jury
proceedings.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(g) refers to “each defendant and witness”
held in custody “pending indictment, arraignment or trial”.91  It has
been argued that since the section can be read to include the de-
tention of a “witness” pending “indictment”, grand jury proceed-
ings are included.  However, a criminal defendant and a material
witness can be detained pending indictment or arraignment if, for
example, a criminal complaint has been filed.  The witness could
appropriately be detained for trial on those charges and/or be de-
posed pursuant to Rule 15.
Rule 46(h) also requires the government to state the reasons
why a detained witness “should not be released with or without the
taking of a deposition pursuant to Rule 15(a).”92  As discussed
above, that rule only authorizes depositions to preserve trial testi-
mony, not grand jury testimony.  Since former Rule 46(a) required
a report for “each” detained witness, its reference to Rule 15(a),
which applies only to trial witnesses, is further proof that Congress
only contemplated the detention of pre-trial witnesses, not grand
jury witnesses.
F. Legislative History
Prior to the enactment of the Fed. R. Crim. P. in 1946, the
Material Witness Statute only authorized the detention of witnesses
88. See Connecticut v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 89 (2000)
(resorting to a section’s title is appropriate where term is ambiguous).
89. Brief for Government at 70n., United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir.
2003) (No. 02-1269).
90. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a).
91. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h).
92. Id.
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whose testimony would be necessary “on the trial of any criminal pro-
ceeding”.93  The 1946 enactment of former Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(b),
titled “Bail for Witness,” authorized a court to require bail “[i]f it
appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material in any
criminal proceeding and if it is shown that it may become impracti-
cable to secure his presence by subpoena. . .”94  The Bacon court
held that by removing the word “trial” Congress intended to ex-
pand the statute to include grand jury witnesses.  That holding is
flawed, however, because the Advisory Committee Note to former
Rule 46(b) expressly states that the rule is “substantially a restate-
ment of existing law.”95  For nearly 200 years the law had authorized
the arrest of only potential trial witnesses.96  Clearly, if Congress
had intended to expand the authority to arrest and detain witnesses
beyond what had existed for nearly 200 years, it would not have
characterized the change as a “restatement of existing law.”  In-
deed, “[i]t would have been extraordinary for Congress to make
such an important change in the law without any mention of that
possible effect.”97  In addition, the Bacon court ignored the rule
that courts will not presume a change in substantive law unless that
change is clearly expressed.98  Congress did not clearly express a
change when they replaced the term “trial” with “criminal proceed-
ing” in enacting former Rule 46.
Nothing in the legislative history of the Material Witness Stat-
ute or its predecessor statutes provides clear evidence that Congress
intended to authorize the arrest and detention of grand jury wit-
nesses.  The Second Circuit thus was forced to rely on a single foot-
note in a Committee report accompanying the 1984 re-enactment
93. 28 U.S.C. § 659 (repealed 1948) (emphasis added).
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b).  This rule replaced former § 659.
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b) advisory committee’s note  (emphasis added).
96. See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F.Supp.2d 55, 75 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), for
an explication of pre-1946 material witness statutes.
97. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 176 (1993).
98. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993); Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmire Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957).  In addition, the Bacon court’s inabil-
ity “to accept” that the Supreme Court intended that the statute only apply to pre-trial
witnesses is not, as the District Court pointed out, a legally valid reason for rejecting the
clear statement in the legislative history.  “Whatever merits these and other policy argu-
ments may have, it is not the province of [the courts] to rewrite the statute [or Rules] to
accommodate them.”  Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 10 (2000).
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of the law for the proposition that Congress intended to expand the
statute to authorize the arrest of grand jury witnesses.99  That foot-
note, which immediately follows the term “criminal proceeding” in
the Committee Report, states: “A grand jury is a ‘criminal proceed-
ing’ within the meaning of [18 U.S.C. § 3144]. Bacon v. United
States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).”100  The significance given to
this isolated footnote is unwarranted.
Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute
is entitled to “great weight.”101  However, a statement in a conference
report of such legislation as to what Congress believes an earlier
statute meant is “obviously less weighty”.102  For that footnote to be
controlling it must be: 1) an authoritative interpretation of what
the 1966 statute meant, or 2) an authoritative expression of what
the 1984 Congress intended.103  The footnote fails on both counts.
First, the footnote cannot represent an authoritative interpretation
of the term “criminal proceeding” as used in either the 1948 or
1966 law since “it is the function of the courts, not the Legislature
to say what an enacted statute means.”104  Second, the 1984 Con-
gress simply reenacted language that was present in material wit-
ness statutes since 1946, thus the footnote cannot explain any words
that the 1984 Committee itself drafted.  As the Pierce court noted,
“[q]uite obviously, reenacting precisely the same language would
be a strange way to make a change.”105  It was in 1946 that the term
“trial” was replaced by “criminal proceeding”.  At that time, Con-
gress specifically noted that the law was not being substantively
changed.  The 1966 and 1984 statutes reenacted the identical lan-
guage.  Absent an express acknowledgement by Congress that it was
99. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 2003).
100. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 28 (1983)).
101. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969).
102. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13
(1980); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968) (“[T]he
views of one Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted many years before by
another Congress have ‘very little, if any, significance.’”) (citations omitted); United
States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”).
103. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988).
104. Id. (holding that a subsequent committee’s reference to several correct judi-
cial interpretations of reenacted statute were not authoritative).
105. Id. at 567.
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making a substantive change in the meaning of that term, the foot-
note is not “authoritative”.106
This interpretation is reinforced by the changes that the 1984
Congress did acknowledge.  The text of the report notes only two
changes to existing law.  The 1984 statute authorizes a judicial of-
ficer to order: 1) an arrest in the first instance, and 2) the detention
of a material witness pursuant to § 3142.  The former change was a
legislative adoption of the implied power to order an arrest recog-
nized in Bacon.  It was the Committee’s understanding that this
power, which was expressly stated in earlier versions of the statute,
was inadvertently omitted during the 1946 changes.107  Yet Con-
gress felt it was necessary to incorporate the arrest power directly
into the statute’s text.  Had the 1984 Congress also intended to leg-
islatively enact that portion of Bacon, which sanctioned the arrest of
grand jury witnesses-–a power not expressly recognized for over 200
years-–that change would have been either incorporated into the
text or, at a minimum, acknowledged as a material change.108  One
cannot rely on a mere footnote as support for such a major change
in the government’s arrest power.109  Moreover, this is not a case
where Congress reenacted a statute that has been given a settled
judicial interpretation.110  Prior to 1984, only two cases addressed
106. Id. See also Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994) (declining to
read into statute procedure “endorsed” by the Senate Committee, but not contained
within statute’s text).
107. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 28-29 (1983).
108. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) (where report refers to
amendment as only a material change from existing law, it is an error to infer other
substantive changes).
109. The unreliability of citing cases in Committee Reports was noted by Justice
Scalia in his concurring opinion in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989):
As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional committee
reports is well aware, the references to the cases were inserted, at best by a
committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a com-
mittee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose
of those references was not primarily to inform the Members of Congress
what the bill meant . . . but rather to influence judicial construction.  What
a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her cita-
tion of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the
land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.  I de-
cline to participate in this process.
110. Cf. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (where there has been a
uniform judicial interpretation of a statutory term, courts are justified in presuming
Congress was aware of that interpretation when it re-enacted the statute).
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whether a grand jury is a “criminal proceeding” under Title 18.
The Bacon court found that it was.  In United States v. Thompson,111
the Second Circuit held that a grand jury is not a criminal proceed-
ing.  Two conflicting decisions do not produce “settled” law.112
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Extending the Material Witness Statute to grand jury witnesses
would raise significant constitutional problems.  “If an otherwise ac-
ceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is
‘fairly possible,’ [courts] are obligated to construe the statute to
avoid such problems.”113  Thus, the courts should apply the Mate-
rial Witness Statute only to trial witnesses.
Extending the statute to grand jury witnesses would eviscerate
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures
and raise serious due process concerns.  It would cede to the execu-
tive the unchecked authority to arrest and detain individuals simply
on the word of a government official that he or she possesses “mate-
rial” information.  Moreover, that detention could continue indefi-
nitely since the statute does not require that the witness appear
before the grand jury within any specified period of time and does
not offer the protection accorded trial witnesses.  Consequently, the
importance of the government’s interest does not outweigh the ex-
tent of the intrusion on individual liberty.114
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures.  The Material Witness Statute authorizes an individual’s ar-
rest, which is the classic seizure.115  Applying the balancing test
mandated by Terry v. Ohio116 and Tennessee v. Garner,117 to the Mate-
rial Witness Statute does not withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny
if the statute is extended to grand jury witnesses.  Under Terry, an
individual may be detained briefly, and his outer clothing searched
111. 310 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1963).
112. In Re Century Prods., Inc. v. Caplan, 22 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994).
113. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (citations omitted).
114. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21 (1968).
115. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
116. Id. at 21.
117. 471 U.S. at 8.
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if a police officer is able to point to “specific and articulable facts
which, . . . warrant that intrusion,” and not inarticulate hunches.118
Those facts must be presented in a manner permitting evaluation
by the “detached neutral scrutiny of a judge.”119  Under the Mate-
rial Witness Statute, however, a conclusory statement by a govern-
ment official can satisfy the materiality requirement.120  Moreover,
virtually anything can be “material” in a grand jury investigation.121
Thus, the grand jury may subpoena and, if the Material Witness
Statute is so construed, deprive someone of their liberty on nothing
more than a “hunch”.122  If applied to grand juries, the Material
Witness Statute would sanction an arrest upon far less information
than is constitutionally required for a Terry stop.  Such a conclusion
is plainly at odds with the Fourth Amendment.
Investigating criminal behavior is a government interest, and
this interest may justify a temporary seizure.123  For pre-trial wit-
nesses, the seizure is limited by the availability of depositions pursu-
ant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a).  That Rule provides a “reasonable
balance among the three competing interests that are at stake when
a defendant is prosecuted: Society’s interest in enforcing the law, a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him, and a witness’s liberty interest.”124  But the deposition
procedure is unavailable to grand jury witnesses.  The unavailability
of a Rule 15 deposition “would eviscerate the limitation that Con-
gress carefully placed upon the government’s power to detain un-
charged witnesses.”125
The potential for Fourth Amendment violations is heightened
in the grand jury context because presentment of grand jury testi-
mony is at the discretion of the United States Attorney and subject
118. 392 U.S. at 21.
119. Id.
120. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
121. See discussion infra Section II(b).
122. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  See also In re Sinadinos, 760 F.2d
167, 169-72 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding the right of a grand jury to subpoena informa-
tion already in its possession).
123. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
124. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 78 (2002).
125. Id.
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to the availability of the grand jury.126  As the Awadallah case vividly
illustrates, the intrusion upon Mr. Awadallah’s liberty—and dig-
nity—far exceeded any legitimate government interest.  As set forth
in detail above, Mr. Awadallah was held under onerous, high-secur-
ity prison conditions for 20 days before he was summoned to the
grand jury.127  Although he requested a deposition on his first ap-
pearance in court, that request was ignored.  To him, any of the
purported protections in the Material Witness Statute were, as
Judge Schleindlin found, “meaningless,”128 thereby denying him
due process of law.129
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “if grand ju-
ries are to be granted extraordinary powers of investigation because
of the difficulty and importance of their task, the use of those pow-
ers ought to be limited as far as reasonably possible to the accom-
plishment of the task.”130  If the Material Witness Statute is
extended to grand jury witnesses, a prosecutor’s power to arrest and
indefinitely detain would be virtually unlimited.  In a society where
“liberty is the norm, and detention . . . without trial [a] carefully
limited exception”131 that result cannot be countenanced.
126. Chief Judge Mukasey opined that “the inability to convene a grand jury
promptly, or to arrange a witness’s prompt appearance before it, generally will not be
the cause of delay in taking the testimony of a grand jury witness. . .” In Re Material
Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (2002).  The twenty-day, high-security detention
of Mr. Awadallah during a time when a grand jury was convened refutes that observa-
tion.  Assuming arguendo that Chief Judge Mukasey is correct, the fact remains that the
statute contains no limitation on how long a grand jury witness may be held before
being called to testify.  That power remains with the government.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
128. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
129. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“[C]ivil commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection.”).
130. United States v. Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. 418, 434-35 (1983) (citing United
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 45-46 (1973) (Marshall, J. dissenting)).
131. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 22 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 22 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR206.txt unknown Seq: 25 16-APR-04 8:54
2003] THE MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE 37
POSTSCRIPT: REPRESENTING A MATERIAL WITNESS;
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
Individuals arrested under the Material Witness Statute are en-
titled to appointment of counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice
Act when making an initial appearance before a magistrate.132  At
that initial appearance, counsel may request that the witness be re-
leased on bail.133  Since the witness presumably was arrested upon a
judicial finding that he or she possessed material information and
would not respond to a subpoena, counsel should demand immedi-
ate disclosure of the affidavit submitted in support of the arrest war-
rant.  Counsel should argue that disclosure is necessary so that the
witness can rebut possible erroneous and/or deliberate misrepre-
sentations made to the issuing magistrate.  Those facts might be rel-
evant on both the issue of bail and/or whether there was, in fact,
probable cause to support the arrest.134  Accordingly, counsel
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(G) (2003) (“[R]epresentation shall be provided for
any financially eligible person who . . . is in custody as a material witness”).
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
134. In Awadallah, for example, the issuing magistrate was never informed of
Awadallah’s consistent cooperation in the 24 hours prior to his detention or his family
ties within the United States.  Judge Scheindlin concluded that these material omissions
negated probable cause for Awadallah’s arrest.  In a particularly alarming portion of its
decision, the Second Circuit held that even if the misrepresentations were excised from
the affidavit and the omissions included, there would have been probable cause to be-
lieve that Mr. Awadallah would not have responded to a subpoena.  The court found
that Mr. Awadallah’s failure to voluntarily come forward in the nine days between the
September 11 attacks and his September 20 arrest standing alone provided probable
cause for his arrest.  United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 70 (2nd Cir. 2003).  In his
concurring opinion, Judge Chester Straub rejected that finding.  After noting that noth-
ing connected Mr. Awadallah to the hijackers other than a piece of papers containing
an eighteen month old phone number, he observed as follows:
It is absolutely true that the acts of terrorism on September 11 were the
equivalent of acts of war and that the investigation galvanized the nation.
In such a climate, it is difficult to view Awadallah’s failure to come forward
with relevant information (again assuming that Awadallah had what he un-
derstood to be relevant information) without some suspicion.  At the same
time, in light of the waves of anti-Muslim sentiment that also followed Sep-
tember 11, as the majority acknowledges, even law-abiding and conscien-
tious members of the Muslim community might, at least initially, have been
reluctant to come forward of their own volition.
Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 78(Straub, J. concurring).  In addition to the foregoing,
the majority’s interpretation that the material witness statute permits arrest for failure
to volunteer information renders that statute unconstitutional under the Fifth Amend-
ment.  United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1968)(“18 U.S.C. §4 [mispri-
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should, in the appropriate case, move for bail and to vacate the
warrant.  Counsel may move to vacate on the ground that the war-
rant was not supported by probable cause to believe that the witness
either possessed material information and/or that the witness
would not respond to a subpoena.  If appropriate, counsel should
also move (either at the initial hearing or thereafter) to vacate the
warrant on the additional grounds that the Material Witness Statute
does not authorize the arrest of a grand jury witness, and that the
statute is unconstitutional as applied to grand jury witnesses.
If the foregoing fails to secure the client’s freedom at the ini-
tial appearance, counsel should also move to have the witness
brought before the grand jury forthwith and/or immediately de-
posed pursuant to the Fed. R. Crim. P.  There may, of course, be
important reasons for delaying any grand jury appearance even if
the client remains incarcerated.  Counsel surely needs to interview
his or her client to determine, for example, whether the witness
could be a target of the investigation, whether the witness needs to
assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination and
to protect against a possible “perjury trap”.  Thus, any application
must be based upon a strategy that is in the client’s best interest.
sion of a felony] would be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment if, and to the
extent, applied to require one in defendant’s circumstances, after learning of a bank
robbery, to report that information to the authorities.”); accord United States v. Dad-
dano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 1970).
